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Abstract		
	
	
This	study	employs	a	structural	gravity	approach	to	analyse	the	impact	of	preferential	trade	
agreements	(PTAs)	on	bilateral	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI).	We	use	the	UNCTAD	global	
database	on	bilateral	FDI	stocks	and	flows.	To	control	for	the	heterogenous	nature	of	PTAs,	
we	employ	two	different	indicators	of	PTA	depth:	the	DESTA	and	World	Bank	indicators.	We	
find	 that	 ’deeper’	 or	 comprehensive	PTAs	 (e.g.	 including	provisions	on	 investment,	 public	
procurement	and	intel-	 lectual	property	rights	provision)	have	a	significant	positive	impact	
on	bilateral	FDI	between	partners.	For	instance,	we	estimate	that	the	deepest	PTA	(with	an	
index	of	seven	in	the	DESTA	database)	is	expected	to	increase	bilateral	FDI	stocks	between	
signatory	 countries	 by	 around	 54%.	 As	 an	 example,	 we	 analyse	 the	 potential	 impact	 on	
foreign	 direct	 investment	 of	 the	 economic	 co-operation	 agreement	 signed	 by	 the	 Pacific	
Alliance	countries	(Chile,	Colombia,	Mexico,	Peru)	in	2012.	
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1 Introduction
In this paper we estimate the potential impact of preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) –and other bilateral policies that affect trade and investment– on the bilat-
eral FDI stocks and flows between the countries signing these agreements. We use
a structural gravity model of FDI, with bilateral FDI data from UNCTAD (2014)
and we control for the presence and depth of preferential trade agreements (PTAs).
We employ two databases to account for the heterogeneity of PTAs: the DESTA
database (Dür et al., 2014) and the World Bank database (Hofmann et al., 2017).
Preferential trade agreements are mainly associated with the increase in bilateral
trade between the participating countries. The impact of preferential trade agree-
ments on foreign direct investment (FDI), however, is less straightforward. Trade
and FDI can either complement or substitute each other, depending on the invest-
ment motivation (i.e. horizontal, vertical), the specific industry and on the way in
which the FDI provisions are shaped in the Regional Investment Facilitation pillar of
the agreement. From a theoretical point of view, horizontal FDI –where firms repli-
cate domestic activities in a foreign country– are associated with FDI substituting
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for trade. Thus, in the presence of horizontal FDI, PTAs are expected to decrease
FDI flows. On the other hand, vertical FDI –where firms split activities between
different geographical regions– creates a complementary relationship between trade,
PTAs and FDI (cf. Markusen, 2002). More recently, the expansion of global value
chains (GVCs), which is a more elaborated form of vertical FDI, has reinforced the
positive link between PTAs and vertical FDI.1
In practice, however, FDI data is a combination of both vertical or horizontal
FDI, since the motivation or purpose of the investments is not usually revealed.2 In
addition, the compilation and reconciliation of bilateral FDI data is a difficult task
(IMF, 2003). It is common that countries report different bilateral FDI values than
the corresponding partners, and a detailed reconciliation of data and compilation
methodologies is required. In this study we employ such a compilation, done by the
UNCTAD (2014) database, which provides bilateral data on inward and outward
FDI flows and stocks. In particular, our main estimations employ the inward FDI
stock data, which fluctuates less and is in general more reliable than year-to-year
FDI flow data. However, we also use inward FDI flows to assess the robustness of
our results.
Since we cannot separate the FDI data between horizontal and vertical FDI,
the expected relation between PTAs, trade and FDI, remain an empirical question.
In this regard, Bergstrand and Egger (2007) use a model with three countries, with
export and FDI data and find that regional integration has a positive trade effect but
a negative effect on FDI. These results, therefore, find support for a substitutability
relation between trade and FDI. On the other hand, other studies that employ
panel data with a larger set of countries, find the opposite results (Daude et al.,
2003; Anderson et al., 2016, 2017). These papers, hence, find empirical support for
a complementary relation between both variables, which can include the creation or
expansion of GVCs with PTAs. Our paper is closest to Anderson et al. (2017), since
our analytical framework is based on their work, but we control for the heterogenous
nature of PTAs (instead of including only a dummy variable for the presence of any
PTA) and we focus our analysis on the traditional "partial-equilibrium" nature of
the gravity model. This allows us to generate a larger number of sensitivity analysis,
to confirm the robustness of the effect of PTAs on FDI.3
Finally, we apply our econometric results to analyse the impact of the Pacific
Alliance on the expected changes in FDI for the region.4 In general, the Latin
1Baldwin and Okubo (2014) go further and divide FDI in six categories. However, the main
distinction of complementary and substitutability links between trade and FDI remain.
2Alfaro and Charlton (2009) identify between vertical and horizontal FDI flows by employing
the implicit information in national input-output tables. However, they only provide information
for a small group of countries.
3The aim of the Anderson et al. (2016, 2017) papers is more ambitious, as they want to obtain
general equilibrium trade and FDI effects of PTAs on real income. For our purposes, we want
to focus on the effect of PTAs on FDI and we are not concerned with the trade nor the general
equilibrium effects that translate into welfare changes.
4The PA was launched in April 2011, officially established in June 2012, but until 2013 an
agreement was signed to reduce 92% of tariffs by May 2016 and to eliminate all tariffs by 2020.
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America and the Caribbean (LAC) region is lagging in terms of trade in services and
FDI related to services with respect to the rest of the World. For instance, services
account for much less of the FDI flows than is usually the case 43% compared to
two-thirds elsewhere (Hollweg et al., 2016). In the case of Pacific Alliance countries,
Sáez et al. (2014) find that for Peru and Colombia the contribution of services in
total trade, both in direct exports or value-addition to other exports, is below what
should be expected for their economic development level. Therefore, promoting
trade and investment in services is a key objective of the Pacific Alliance (PA) and
we provide insights into the key drivers and expected FDI impacts for the region.
2 Analytical framework
This section provides details on the structural gravity model for FDI, our quantita-
tive strategy, and the precise empirical specifications that will be applied.
2.1 Theoretical gravity model for FDI
The framework used to assess FDI performance will be based on recent advances
in the gravity model literature (cf. Yotov et al., 2016). In particular, we follow the
FDI gravity modelling approach developed by Anderson et al. (2016, 2017). Their
model shows how trade and FDI are related and how they respond to natural or
man-made policy barriers to trade and investment. In this paper, we focus solely
on the structural FDI gravity model, its empirical estimation, and the estimated
impacts of PTAs on bilateral FDI stocks. These last estimations will allow us to
estimate the potential FDI impact of different shallow or deep PTAs.
In particular, the Anderson et al. (2016, 2017) model builds on the technology-
capital or knowledge-capital interpretation of FDI.5 Foreign direct investment is
assumed to be comparable with trade in technology services. A given stock of
technology capital (patents, blueprints, management skills, etc.) can be used si-
multaneously in more than one country, on a non-rival basis. The value of the
knowledge capital increases when it can be ’leased’ to other countries in the form of
FDI. Because flows of knowledge capital are to a large extent intangible and there-
fore difficult to measure, the stock of bilateral FDI will be used as a proxy for the
flow of knowledge capital between two countries.6
The value of bilateral FDI originating from country i and hosted in country j is
represented by FDIstockij . It is positively affected by the size of the origin country
The Pacific Alliance strategy has two pillars on services and FDI. One of the pillars is to position
the Pacific Alliance area as an attractive destination for services investment and services trade.
Another is to increase investment and trade in services among the four members of the Alliance
and with the rest of the world.
5Developed inter alia by Markusen (2002) and McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010).
6The gravity model for trade is based on flow values instead of stock values. Like Anderson
et al. (2016, 2017) we use FDI stocks to proxy the FDI-related technology capital flows between
partner countries. Bilateral FDI stock data are more widely available and reliable than FDI flow
data, which have a large degree of volatility over time (cf. Section 3).
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(Ei), because larger economies tend to invest more in technology capital. The bilat-
eral FDI stock is also positively impacted by the size of the destination country (Yj),
because larger economies can in principle absorb more foreign technology. If the size
of the aggregate technology capital stock in country i is expressed by Mi then the
ratio Yj/Mi can be regarded as a crude measure of country j’s potential absorption
capacity for FDI-related technology capital from country i. The free flow of bilat-
eral trade and FDI is hindered by barriers or frictions. For FDI, country j’s relative
openness for FDI-related foreign technology from country i can be represented by
ωij , which has values between 0 and 1.
7 If ωij = 1, country j is fully open for entry
of technology capital from country i, while in case of ωij = 0, no technology capital
originating from country i is admitted. The aforementioned elements form together
the main determinants of bilateral FDI value stock:8
FDIstockij = ω
η
ij
αEi
Pi
Yj
Mi
(1)
The parameter η is the elasticity of FDI revenue flows with respect to the open-
ness measure. More openness in country j will allow country i’s technology stock
to be used more often, resulting in more FDI revenues. The remaining elements in
equation (1) come from the structural gravity system for trade, in which the FDI
determinants are embedded. The parameter α groups a set of fixed parameters from
the theoretical model.9 Finally, Pi is the inward multilateral resistance term of the
gravity trade model. It consistently aggregates bilateral trade costs of country i
versus all other countries:
Pi =
S
U Nÿ
j=1
A
tji
Πj
B(1−σ)
Yj
Y
T
V
1
1−σ
(2)
in which tji are the bilateral trade-cost frictions, such as the effects of distance
and having different languages that increase the costs of bilateral trade; they are
expressed as a per unit cost fraction. Y =
q
Yj is world output or world GDP,
used to normalise the size of each Yj , and σ is the elasticity of substitution from the
CES functions that are used to aggregate the multilateral resistance (MR) terms.10
The intuition here is that inward higher trade frictions in country i increase the
opportunity costs of investing in knowledge capital in the origin country, e.g. by
making complementary foreign inputs more expensive.
7Note that ωij is the inverse of all factors that work out as barriers to foreign direct investment.
8Time indexes are suppressed in this representation. Ei measures the size of country i as total
expenditure, including expenditure on development of technology capital; Yj is a measure for the
size of host country j (total nominal output).
9These include parameters such as the depreciation rate, the discount factor on the utility
function, and other parameters that are used in the underlying theoretical model. See Anderson
et al. (2016, 2017) for details.
10The σ > 1 substitution elasticity expresses here that all countries have a preference for variety
of products and technology capital by country of origin.
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To account for the fact that world trade is a fully integrated system, equation (2)
also holds the term Πj , representing the outward multilateral trade resistances for
country j. It aggregates bilateral trade costs of country j versus all other countries,
thus completing the full FDI gravity system:
Πj =
C
Nÿ
i=1
3
tji
Pi
4(1−σ) Ei
Y
D 1
1−σ
(3)
The intuition for understanding the relation of equation (3) with bilateral FDI is
that higher relative trade costs in host country j increase its domestic prices and thus
lower the country’s real potential for absorbing foreign technology capital (FDI).
The Anderson et al. (2016, 2017) model also includes the analysis of domestic
welfare impacts of FDI in the home and destination countries via the process of
capital accumulation and via creating more product variety or more production effi-
ciency. We do not consider these mechanisms in the present paper, but concentrate
on the effects of different PTAs on bilateral FDI. This restriction means that the
welfare impacts of having more FDI are probably larger than the effects that that
we identify in this paper.
The FDI gravity model distinguishes two types of frictions that affect bilateral
FDI. Both friction impact on bilateral FDI through different channels. First there
are the standard bilateral trade frictions (tji), covered by the common gravity con-
trol variables (PTAs, distance, common border, common language and colonial ties),
which indirectly also act as FDI barriers. Secondly, there are the explicit FDI bar-
riers that are captured by the FDI-openness measure ωij . It includes specific FDI
barriers such as bureaucratic red tape, protection of national champions, sheltered
industries and other restrictive measures, as well as the impact of bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs) and currency unions. Below we sketch the full set of factors
that may affect bilateral FDI and trade, including the non-bilateral frictions:
• The first component is related to characteristics of the country of FDI origin
or source country. Possible robust determinants of FDI in the country of origin
include labour costs, corporate tax rate, corruption, and bureaucratic red tape,
among others. These factors may vary over time.
• The second component includes FDI determinants that are related to the des-
tination or host country. Potentially relevant factors for incoming FDI are
corruption levels, internal political tensions, labour costs and human capital
abundance, corporate tax rate, bureaucratic red tape, quality of institutions
and the ease of doing business. These factors are also time variant.
• The third component includes time-invariant bilateral characteristics common
to the standard gravity formulation: distance, contiguity, common language
and colonial ties. These factors tend to be time invariant.
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• The last component includes time-varying bilateral determinants of FDI. This
group includes PTAs, and other trade policy variables: BITs and currency
unions.
The inward and outward multilateral resistance terms (Pi and Πj , respectively)
are theoretical constructs that capture general equilibrium effects that are usually
not directly observable. In other words, they capture all impact factors in, respec-
tively, the origin and destination countries. The model shows that the frictions in
trade system have a separate impact on bilateral FDI, even apart from the FDI
openness measure ωij . In the empirical work we analyse this dual impact, by us-
ing the inward multilateral resistance term from the trade sub-model of the gravity
system. A higher inward MR in the PA countries (here interpreted as destination
countries j for FDI) implies that they will have less imports, higher prices, lower real
income, and hence lower Ej and lower Yj . This is a already a sufficient condition
for them to have less FDI absorption capacity, even if we disregard their explicit
FDI barriers. Consequently, we use the inward MR of the trade sub-model as a
very informative index to identify the national policies that lower the inward MR
for trade, and therefore indirectly contribute to more FDI absorption and more FDI
inflows. Separately we analyse the impacts of more bilateral FDI openness (ωij,t).
2.2 Best-practices regarding the structural gravity equation
The empirical gravity equation is used intensively in many empirical trade applica-
tions. Important data-related and econometric challenges must be taken into account
so that the gravity estimation is neither biased nor inconsistent with its theoretical
foundations. We follow the recommendations listed in Yotov et al. (2016).
First, in line with the recent literature we employ a Pseudo-Poisson maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimator, because it effectively deals with zero bilateral FDI
flows and accounts for the presence of heteroskedasticity in trade data (Santos Silva
and Tenreyro, 2006). Thus, we are careful to distinguish sharply between real zero
FDI (flows or stocks) and missing (or non-reported, suppressed) data. However,
it must be noted a priori that the quality of the data on bilateral FDI flows leaves
more uncertainty on this issue than holds for the case of, for instance, bilateral trade
flows.
Second, we also follow the best practice of using country-pair-fixed effects to
account for any unobservable time invariant trade cost components. Using these
pair-fixed effects has been proven to be a better measure of the bilateral trade costs
than the standard set of gravity variables (Egger and Nigai, 2015; Agnosteva et al.,
2014). In addition, the standard gravity equation applied to bilateral trade flows,
points to an endogeneity issue regarding the relation between PTAs and trade. In
general, PTAs are more likely between partners that already have intense trade
relations. This endogeneity problem will also be present when dealing with FDI
flows. Several methods can be used to account for this issue (see for example, Egger
et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2016). Here we first follow the common practice of using
pair-fixed effect, which will also deal with the endogeneity of PTAs by accounting
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for the observable and unobservable linkages between the endogenous trade policy
covariate and the error term (Yotov et al., 2016). In addition, the use of only one
PTA variable may still give biased results if there are simultaneous other pairwise
time-varying factors that could play a role in determining FDI. This is why we
combine our PTA indicators with other policy variables such as bilateral investment
treaties (BITs).
Third, we use exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects to properly account
for multilateral resistance terms in panel data gravity estimations (Olivero and
Yotov, 2012). In our application "exporter" will refer to the FDI country of ori-
gin (outward FDI stock) and "importer" the FDI destination country (inward FDI
stock). Note that as well as accounting for the unobservable multilateral resistance
terms, the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects also absorb the country
size variables (Ejt and Yit) from the structural gravity system in equations (1-3),
in addition to all other observable and unobservable time-varying country-specific
characteristics, including different national policies, institutions, and exchange rates
(Yotov et al., 2016).
Fourth, we use panel data, which leads to improved estimation efficiency, and
more importantly, allows the use of the country-pair-fixed-effects and the exporter-
time and importer-time fixed effects methods mentioned above.
Fifth, we must account for the effect of non-discriminatory domestic policies.
Even if they are not explicitly discriminating foreign trade and investment, they
still are likely to affect the level and pattern of international trade and investment
(Kox and Lejour, 2005). To estimate the effects of non-discriminatory trade policy
we follow Heid et al. (2015), which estimate the structural gravity model using
both international and intra-national trade flows. The same reasoning may apply
to FDI flows, and we assume that non-discriminatory policies equivalently influence
domestic capital stocks and inward FDI stocks. (Yotov et al., 2016) mention some
further reasons why the gravity estimations should include international and intra-
national (domestic) flows:
• For theoretically consistent identification of the effects of bilateral trade poli-
cies. In particular, for bias-free estimation of the effects of PTAs on trade (and
FDI).
• For resolving the ’distance puzzle’ by accounting for domestic trading distances
Sixth, since trade (and FDI) flows do not respond immediately to trade policy
changes, some authors have criticised the use of panel-data estimations over consec-
utive years (Trefler, 2004). To avoid this issue, Trefler (2004) used 3-year intervals,
while other authors also experimented with 4- and 5-year intervals.11 In our case,
since FDI data is less frequent, scarcer and much more volatile than trade data we
11Olivero and Yotov (2012) show that there there are no significant differences when using 3-year
and 5-year interval trade data, but that the use of consecutive years yield suspicious estimates of
the trade cost elasticity parameters.
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use 3-year averages to both smooth the volatility of the series and to better capture
the delayed response of FDI to policy changes.12
Seventh and final, there is a large number of PTAs and there is significant het-
erogeneity between them (Horn et al., 2010). Thus, using a simple PTA dummy
variable will bias the effects of PTAs on FDI flows, and we need to account for the
"depth" of PTAs. Deep PTAs usually include investment provisions that are not
present in "shallow" PTAs. We apply several PTA depth indicators, to be detailed
in Section 3.3.
2.3 Main regression equation
Based on the seven best practices explained above, the structural model of equations
(1) to (3) is then applied to a data panel (with time t) using the following econometric
specification:
FDIijt = exp [“1POLijt + µit + µjt + µij ] + ‘ijt (4)
where FDIijt is the inward FDI stock in country of destination i (the reporting coun-
try) from country of origin j (the partner country) in period t (the 3-year average
in our base case). Moreover, POLijt is a time-variant vector of bilateral policy vari-
ables (e.g. PTAs, bilateral investment treaties), µit are time-varying source-country
fixed effect (dummy variables) that control for the outward multilateral resistance
terms and countries’ output shares, µjt are time-varying destination-country fixed
effects that account for the inward multilateral resistance terms and total expendi-
ture, µij are the set of country-pair fixed effects that will absorb all time-invariant
gravity covariates from tij along with any other time-invariant determinants of trade
costs that are not observable, and ‘ijt is a combined error term. Equation (4) will
then be our main estimating equation.
2.4 Identifying FDI determinants
After employing equation (4) as our baseline, a stepwise analysis is used to gain
additional insights in the drivers of FDI flows. Note that the use of pair-fixed effects
in equation (4) effectively absorbs the bilateral time-invariant covariates used in the
standard gravity equation (i.e. bilateral distance, contiguity, language and colonial
ties), but will not affect the estimation of the trade policy variables that by definition
are time-varying. Therefore, we also use the standard gravity equation:
FDIijt = exp [“1POLijt + “2Cij + µit + µjt] + ‘ijt (5)
where Cij is the vector of time-invariant bilateral control variables (i.e. distance,
language, contiguity, colony).
A comparison of the results from equations (4) and (5) makes it possible to
identify the importance of the specific pairwise effects in Cij , and we can build
12We also experiment with 4-year averages. In addition, the use of averages uses helps in some
cases where there are negative stocks and flows, as explained in Section 3.
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upon this to identify additional FDI determinants. In particular, we follow this
step-wise approach:
• Step 1: We use the gravity estimation from equation (4) with country-pair
fixed effects as our benchmark –since it accounts for all observable and unob-
servable trade costs. These estimations will provide the information regarding
the relative FDI stock position of PA countries (and candidate PA countries),
with respect to other comparable countries. In particular, we use the inward
multilateral resistance terms as an indicator of country-specific in the destina-
tion country that determine FDI inflows taken into account policy variables
(i.e. the impact of PTAs) and with respect to comparable country character-
istics.
• Step 2: Include additional policy variables: alternative PTA indicators , cur-
rency unions, BITs, and other policy indices. This will inform about the
potential impact of selected policies on the probability of an increase in FDI
flows for the PA countries.
• Step 3: Use the inward multilateral resistance terms from the first step to
analyse the impact of different country-specific variables to explain the FDI
inflows. We include here indicators for national differences in business costs
(costs of doing business, governance and political stability, economic liber-
alisation) and other FDI determinants (FDI restrictiveness, human capital,
logistics and infrastructure development, taxes on income and profit).
This three-step approach is motivated by the fact that the our man structural
gravity model uses a series of fixed effects to account for all country-time-specific
and country-pair-specific observed and unobserved factors. However, even though
this approach generates much better estimates of the overall impact of PTAs on
bilateral FDI flows, it does not identify which potential factors are important. In
the stepwise approach we can identify variables of which the literature suggests
that they are significant FDI determinants and which can be hidden in the fixed
effects estimates. If these variables have a specific importance for explaining FDI
flows, the outcomes of the augmented SG equations from the second and third steps
can be compared to the simple SG outcomes of the first step in order to identify
some of the elements that were hidden in the estimated dummy coefficients of the
first step. In practice, this means that we will estimate equation (5) using different
combinations of the control and policy variables in C and POL. As explained above,
for our purposes the most relevant policy variable is the depth of PTAs, where the
estimated coefficient of this variable provides an assessment of the potential impact
that the PA treaty can have on bilateral FDI flows.
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3 Data
Data availability is a serious issue with regard to FDI (IMF, 2003). This is one of
the reasons that not many gravity analyses have been applied to FDI flows, because
gravity analysis has to be based on bilateral flows. However, most data sources on
FDI (e.g. UNCTAD, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators) only provide
inflows or outflows from/to the Rest of the World. These data are therefore unfit
for gravity analysis. Moreover, the gravity analysis requires the information of the
full world FDI matrix (although some simplification is possible by grouping together
minor countries/regions). Only a few sources offer consistent time series for bilateral
FDI flows.13
3.1 FDI bilateral data compilation
We use UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics (UNCTAD, 2014), which provides sys-
tematic FDI data for 206 countries, covering inflows, outflows, inward stocks ("in-
stock") and outward FDI stocks ("outstock"). These UNCTAD data is collected
mainly from national sources when available, if not available it is complemented
with data from partner countries (mirror data) as well as data from other interna-
tional organisations.
These data are available as 206 individual country excel spread sheets, which
include separate sheets for the four FDI categories: inflows, outflows, instock and
outstock. We processed each country specific-excel files and compile all of them into
a Stata database file. This database has available information for the years 2001 to
2012, and all the data are in US$ millions. The database distinguished between zero
flows ("–") and missing data (".."). In addition, each country has a limited (non-
exhaustive) number of partners reported. In other words, if a country-pair does not
have any reported FDI data for any given year in the sample period, then it is simply
not reported in the excel files.14 There are also regional aggregates (i.e. Southeast
Asia, Oceania) with reported data, that are not always assigned (partially or fully)
to individual countries within that region. Likewise, the total FDI values (assigned
to "World") usually do not sum up to the individual countries’ total.
We follow the data procedure and theoretical framework from Anderson et al.
(2016) and thus, we also use mainly the inward stock data from UNCTAD –which is
also the FDI category with most data availability– and complement this information
with the "mirror" outward stock data (when inward stock is missing or zero). This
"mirroring" procedure extends the sample country from 206 to 217, by including
13An alternative database, which has information at the industry level and has been used in
some papers to estimate FDI gravity models is the F DImarkets database (www.fdimarkets.com)
of the Financial Times. However, this database has two main limitations: it only reports announced
(instead of actual) investments and it only has information on green-field investment rather than
on total FDI. Even though the sectoral/industry dimension of t, F DImarkets can be valuable for
a more detailed analysis, these serious database limitations does not allow for the country-wide
analysis we conduct in this paper.
14We take these data points as "missing" for the moment, but they could be assumed to be "zeros".
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countries that are not individually reported by the UNCTAD database, but for
which there is outward data from a partner country (e.g. Andorra, Faroe Islands).
For sensitivity analysis we can also use the UNCTAD bilateral FDI flows, instead
of the inward stocks.15
Our compiled UNCTAD database consists then of 217 countries, 12 years (2001
to 2012), 80071 total observations, 7923 total country-pairs with and average number
of observations by country-pair of 10.1 Of this there are 2322 negative values (3% of
total observations) and 26,434 zero values (33%). For the Pacific Alliance countries
(Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru), we have 3640 total observations, with 377
country-pairs, and an average of 9.7 observations per pair. This includes information
on 100 (origin) countries with FDI stocks in the PA countries, and 65 (destination)
countries with FDI stocks from PA.
In Table 1 we present the results FDI inward stocks for the PA countries and for
comparative reasons, a group of selected countries, mainly in Latin America.
Table 1: Inward FDI stocks by host country, in US$ million
Inward FDI stocks as share of GDP (current US$)
Host country 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012
Chile 22,447 48,977 101,010 148,187 31.1% 39.0% 57.7% 60.2%
Colombia 7,757 11,985 20,102 25,397 8.0% 8.4% 8.8% 7.7%
Mexico 82,489 129,439 208,071 335,026 11.4% 14.9% 20.5% 29.5%
Peru 13,611 14,305 17,858 22,640 24.7% 18.5% 15.6% 13.3%
Argentina 49,909 63,017 80,155 95,502 30.3% 31.7% 24.5% 19.1%
Bolivia 813 1,606 3,629 7,836 10.1% 16.2% 23.1% 33.3%
Brazil 82,802 148,190 231,256 699,871 15.3% 16.7% 14.6% 28.8%
Costa Rica 1,967 2,844 6,687 16,313 11.9% 14.0% 22.8% 38.8%
Ecuador 1,595 1,705 2,846 4,746 5.6% 4.1% 4.9% 6.0%
Panama 8,289 9,973 15,713 23,048 63.4% 60.4% 65.4% 67.0%
Paraguay 916 1,257 2,374 3,572 13.4% 13.8% 14.8% 15.4%
Uruguay 4,736 5,927 9,103 10,742 30.5% 35.1% 32.0% 23.1%
Venezuela 17,983 16,514 24,729 31,693 18.0% 11.2% 8.5% 8.7%
China 432,548 599,897 831,801 1,149,665 29.0% 25.7% 18.8% 15.5%
USA 1,347,843 1,656,561 2,022,859 2,461,747 12.2% 12.7% 13.9% 15.8%
Source: Own calculations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI database.
We observe that Mexico has the largest FDI inward stocks from the PA region,
followed by Chile. But Chile has a relatively large share of FDI with respect to
GDP that is twice the share for Mexico. On the other hand, Peru and Colombia are
both lagging behind in terms of inward FDI, with relatively low FDI stocks –even
by Latin American standards.
When we look at the within PA region FDI inward stocks (see Table 2), we ob-
serve that the FDI flows have been steadily increasing within the region.16 Specially
in Colombia the inward FDI stocks have increased the most and have become the
15An additional source of information, used by Anderson et al. (2016) that we can use later to
complement the UNCTAD data, is the FDI data from the International Direct Investment Statistics
database, which is constructed and maintained by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).
16Note that in the period 2001-2005 there are five country-pair cells with missing values (Chile-
Mexico, Chile-Peru, Colombia-Peru, Mexico-Chile and Mexico-Peru, and two cells in the period
2006-2008 (Colombia-Peru and Mexico-Peru). In the Table 2 these are taken as zero values.
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largest within PA stocks by 2010-2012. On the other hand, the relative importance
of the intra-PA flows varies much by country. For Colombia, the intra-PA FDI flows
is very large, representing almost two-thirds of Colombia’s total FDI stock. For Peru
the intra-PA are also significant but much less important than for Colombia, ranging
from 24 to 39%. On the contrary, the intra-PA FDI are just 1% or less of the total
FDI inward stock in Mexico, and less than 10% for Chile during this period.
Table 2: Inward FDI stocks by host country from Pacific Alliance partners, in US$
million
Inward FDI stocks with PA partners as share of total inward stocks
Host country 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012
Chile 0 560 3,821 13,537 0.0% 1.1% 3.8% 9.1%
Colombia 0 305 4,932 15,919 0.0% 2.5% 24.5% 62.7%
Mexico 0 513 2,023 3,423 0.0% 0.4% 1.0% 1.0%
Peru 3,210 4,145 6,536 8,733 23.6% 29.0% 36.6% 38.6%
Note that there are missing data on bilateral inward stocks, so not all values are zero. Source:
Own calculations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI database.
To obtain the domestic capital stock data, we employ the 2017 version of the
IMF Investment and Capital Stock Dataset (IMF, 2015). These real investment and
capital stock series are given in constant international dollars using constant (2011)
PPP exchange rates (to make the series comparable across countries). The series are
also presented in national currency, but to be comparable to our FDI data, we need
to convert these values to US dollars. For this we use the PPP conversion factor
from the WDI database.17
We then construct 3- and 4-year average FDI inward stock values to be used in
our main econometric specification. Note that there is a very small proportion (less
than 3%) of stock values in the UNCTAD database that are negative. This issue
can be explained by looking into the three elements included in the FDI flow and
stock values:
1. Greenfield direct investments/disinvestments
2. Changes in intra-company loans or leases or franchise fees between holding
and subsidiaries
3. Changes in valuation of foreign subsidiaries (either changes in equity valuation
or appreciation/depreciation of real investment stock, or acquisition changes
of local minority-owned subsidiaries (<10% owned)
In particular, the last two elements can result in negative flows and even stocks.
Using the average data over 3 or 4 years solves part of this problem. However,
since the PPML regressions cannot be performed over negative values, we set the
remaining negative values equal to zero.
17These are the purchasing power parity conversion factors for GDP taken from the 2011 World
Bank International Comparison Program (ICP).
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3.2 Control variables for the gravity estimations
We then link the FDI database with country and regional identifiers (ISO-3 codes,
country number codes and geographical identifiers) and we obtain additional control
variables –to be used in the gravity regressions) from the CEPII database (Head
et al., 2010). These include variables such as distance, contiguity, language, colonial
past, and other dyadic variables (which we do not use so far in the regressions).
The CEPII database does not have information for small countries that are
offshore financial hubs, mainly in the Caribbean and Europe (e.g. Anguilla, US
Virgin Islands, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey). Therefore,
we exclude these countries, and lose around four thousand observations, to have a
final sample of around 76115 observations.
3.3 Policy variables
The main policy variable we analyse is the presence and depth of PTAs. Regard-
ing the impact of free trade agreements, their depth and heterogeneity we use the
DESTA database (Dür et al., 2014). We take care of the endogeneity of free trade
agreements (see Egger et al., 2011; Yotov et al., 2016). Apart from the widely used
DESTA database PTA depth index, we also use the most recent World Bank PTA
depth database (Hofmann et al., 2017) to check the robustness of our results. Fi-
nally, we also use the recently updated version of Mario Larch’s Regional Trade
Agreements Database (Egger and Larch, 2008) for robustness analysis. In the fol-
lowing subsections, we describe both databases and other policy variables we employ
in our analysis.
3.3.1 DESTA database
To obtain information on the presence of PTAs for country dyads and in their
heterogeneity, we use the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database (Dür et al.,
2014). This database has systematically collected data on almost 790 agreements,
which are then codified to identify PTAs and create a PTA depth index (according
to the number of seven types of provisions present or not in the agreement). In this
sense, the depth index has values between zero (no PTA) to seven (deep PTA, when
all seven provisions are covered).18
The most recent database (March 2017) covers the time period between 1948
and 2016. Since many of the "base" agreements, are later modified (by accessions,
withdrawals, amendments, consolidations, or are currently under negotiation) there
are 6176 entries in the database.19
18Note that the DESTA depth indicator is a "count" indicator but not an accumulative indicator.
Hence, any PTA with two provisions, no matter which, will have a depth index of two.
19Since this number refers to unique country pairs, then we have 12352 observations when we allow
each observation to have its dual country-pair, i.e. DESTA orders each country pair by alphabetical
order. So for example, a German-Dutch treaty will only appear as DEU-NLD in DESTA, but we
also include its dual observation: NLD-DEU, so it can match are dual country dyads from the FDI
database.
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Some adjustments have been made to the original DESTA database. Most im-
portantly, even though the PA was officially launched on April, 2011, established
in 2012, but not until 2013 where tariff reductions negotiated. Furthermore, it is
not until 2016 that there will be the first trade liberalisation process (i.e. 92% tariff
reduction). In the DESTA database the treaty is recorded as entering entered into
force in 2012 and is classified as having six of the seven treaty provisions (all except
"competition"). We correct this by changing the treaty’s entry year as 2016, instead
of 2012.
A second major adjustment relates to the EU. DESTA incorrectly fails to con-
sider the EU as a PTA, so for all EU member states we had to correct this. Every
EU country-pair has a PTA with each other, and furthermore, we classify this PTA
as a deep PTA (with value seven). Here we also account for the year of accession
of new member states (2004 for ten new members states, and 2007 for Bulgaria and
Romania). A third correction is that DESTA does not consider the EU-Central
America Association Agreement to be implemented, but the "trade pillar" has been
provisionally applied since the end of 2013 (differing by Central American country),
so we take this PTA to be implemented since 2014.20 Also the Central America PTA
is already in effect since 1993, since the implementation of the "Protocolo al Tratado
General de Integración Económica Centroamericana (Protocolo de Guatemala)".
When we link our bilateral FDI database to the DESTA database we account for
the "entry-year": the year in which the agreement entered into force. So for country-
pairs with FDI data, we can identify which agreement was in place, if any, for each
of the 12 years in our sample period. Note that each country pair can have more
than one treaty, and in some special cases, they can have two treaties implemented
on the same year (in this last case, we take only the treaty with the highest depth
index).
In addition, we also construct a dummy PTA variable using the information
provided by DESTA. When the depth index is larger than zero and the PTA is
implemented, we consider it to have an PTA. Otherwise we set PTA=0 (when there
is no DESTA information, the depth index is zero or the treaty has not been im-
plemented yet). Moreover, when there is no information on the depth index (e.g.
because there was no match between a country-pair in the FDI database and the
DESTA database) we assign the depth index a value of zero.
Finally, we also employ each of the seven components of the DESTA depth index,
which are dummy variables that flag the presence of the following provisions in the
FTA: fullpta, provisions on common (trade) standards, services trade provisions,
competition provisions, provisions on public procurement, provisions on investment
and provisions on intellectual property rights. Using individually each of these
provisions we can isolate which component is more important to explain FDI inflows.
20The agreement consists of two other pillars: political dialogue and cooperation, which are not
relevant for our purposes.
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3.3.2 World Bank horizontal depth PTA database
Recently, the World Bank (Hofmann et al., 2017) compiled a database that includes
279 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by 189 countries and reported to the
WTO between 1958 and 2015. The database builds on the methodology developed
by Horn et al. (2010) and it explicitly reports if each PTA includes any of up to
52 provisions on different policy areas and the legal enforceability of each provision.
Thus, in total the database provides information over 104 variables (52 provisions
and their legal enforceability).
Some of these provisions relate to policy areas that fall under the current man-
date of the WTO –referred to as "WTO plus" or "WTO+" in the literature. This
for instance includes topics related to anti-dumping measures, export taxes, cus-
toms regulations, technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary
standards (SPS). It also reports provisions outside the WTO mandate (i.e. "WTO
extra" or "WTO-X") which includes a wider range of policy areas, such as investment
provisions and environmental standards.
This rich source of information allows the construction of different PTA depth in-
dexes, based on the type of provision (WTO+, or WTO-X) or on the classification of
"core" provisions, which is based on what the literature (e.g. Baldwin, 2008; Damuri,
2012)consider to be the more significant or "core" provisions from an economic point
of view: all the WTO+ provisions, in addition to four WTO-X provisions (com-
petition policy, investment, movement of capital, and intellectual property rights
protection).
To account for the depth of a PTA we use four indexes, which are based on the
three original indexes developed in Hofmann et al. (2017), plus an additional index.
• The first two indexes are the "total depth" indexes, which are the simple count
of legally enforceable provisions included in a PTA (defined as wb_tot_le)
and the simple count of the 52 provisions (wb_tot_pr). The first was origi-
nally included in Hofmann et al. (2017) and we construct the second index for
robustness purposes.
• The "core depth" variable (wb_core), which follows and counts the total num-
ber of "core" provisions that are included and legally enforceable in a PTA.
• The "PCA depth" index (wb_pca) based on principal component analysis
(PCA) to obtain an index for the variability in the data.
Finally, we also create a dummy variable (PTAwb), with the value of one for
those dyads where a FTA is present in the World Bank database.
3.3.3 Additional sources of policy indicators
As an alternative source of policy variables we also use the the following CEPII
database indicators:
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• "PTA_wto": taken from the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Information
System (RTA-IS), with data updated until 2015.
• "PTA_hmr": taken from Head et al. (2010) is an PTA dummy variable with
available data until 2006.
• "PTA_bb": taken from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and updated in 2009.21 It
takes four values: Free Trade Agreement (=1), Customs Union (=2), Common
Market (=3) and Economic Union (=4). These data are available until 2005.
• GATT/WTO membership: is a dummy variable that distinguished if the origin
of country ("gatt_o") or the destination country ("gatt_d") is a member of the
GATT and/or WTO. We construct three dummy variables using these data:
"gatt_b" is one if both countries are GATT/WTO members, "gatt1" is one if
one of the two countries is a member and "gatt0" is equal to one if neither is
a member.
• Common currency: indicates thee presence of currency unions taken by the
dataset from de Sousa (2012).
• World Development Indicators (WDI) on the cost of doing business that has
the following individual indicators:
– Cost of business start-up procedures (as a percentage of GNI per capita)
for both the origin ("entry_cost_o") and the destination ("entry_cost_d")
country
– Number of start-up procedures to register a business for country of origin
("entry_proc_o") and destination ("entry_proc_d").
– Time (in days) required to start a business, also for country of origin
("entry_time_o") and destination ("entry_time_d").
– Number of days plus procedures to start a business ("entry_tp_o" and
"entry_tp_d").
As an alternative source of PTA data we also use Mario Larch’s Regional Trade
Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008). This database distinguishes
between different degrees of trade integration: partial scope agreements (PS), tra-
ditional PTAs, customs unions (CU) and economic integration agreements (EIA).
There are also combinations of these variables (e.g. CU and EIA, PTA and EIA)
and a composite indicator "RTA", which is equal to one if any one of PS, PTA, CU
or EIA is in place, and zero otherwise.
Following Anderson et al. (2016) we also construct an indicator (dummy) variable
for the existence of a bilateral investment treaties (BITs) from the original UNCTAD
data on international investment agreements.22
21http://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/DataEIA2009/EIA_Data_June30_2009.zip.
22Taken from the International Investment Agreements Navigator: investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/IIA.
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We also use the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index from the OECD.23 This
index measures statutory restrictions to foreign direct investment in 62 countries
and it is available for following years: 1997, 2003, 2006, 2010-2016.
In addition, we employ the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015 update)
from Kaufmann et al. (2010). They constructed aggregate indicators of six broad
dimensions of governance: i. voice and accountability; ii. political stability and
absence of violence/terrorism; iii. government effectiveness; iv. regulatory quality;
v. rule of law; and vi. control of corruption. These six aggregate indicators are based
on 31 underlying data sources that report on the perceptions of governance using a
large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. Finally, we
also use the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World (cf. Gwartney et al.,
2014)
Finally, we also use data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI) database on human capital levels: the abour force with basic (lab_bas) and
advanced (lab_adv) education as a percentage of the total working-age population.
We also use the overall logistics performance index (where a value of one denotes
low performance and five is high performance), which proxies for trade infrastructure
on ports, airports, roads, customs and border crossing. To proxy for taxes paid by
multinationals we use the WDI variable on taxes on income, profits and capital gains
as a percentage of revenue.
4 FDI gravity results
In this section, we present the results of our three-step approach, which was explained
in Section 2.4.
4.1 Main results
In our first step we estimate our preferred econometric specification from Equation 4.
To estimate the PPML regressions we use Zylkin’s STATA ado files (cf. Larch et al.,
2017), which provide a much faster estimation than the normal STATA command.
The results of our main estimating equation (4) are presented in Table 3. Here we
observe that the DESTA depth index has a positive and significant effect on inward
FDI stocks, while the PTA dummy variable (constructed using the DESTA database)
is also positive and significant when using country-pair fixed effects (equation 4).
The regressions reported in Table 3 use the automatic three-way clustering option
(by exporter-id, importer-id, and time-id), but the results are robust to different
specification from the PPML command from Larch et al. (2017) –i.e. robust standard
errors, clustered standard errors by country pairs and when it is assumed that the
pair fixed effects apply symmetrically to flows in both directions. Given the high
correlation between the PTA dummy and the PTA depth indicators, we do not
regress them together.
23The methodology used to calculate the FDI Index is explained in Kalinova et al. (2010) and
the data is taken from: http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm.
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Table 3: Main FDI gravity regressions using 3-year average inward FDI stocks
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FTA_depth 0.062*** 0.290***
(0.018) (0.017)
FTA 0.323*** 0.695***
(0.070) (0.098)
ln_DIST -0.867*** -0.431*** -0.775***
(0.076) (0.063) (0.074)
CNTG 0.882*** 0.579*** 0.691***
(0.148) (0.134) (0.127)
LANG 1.476*** 1.392*** 1.462***
(0.080) (0.084) (0.079)
CLNY 2.633*** 2.619*** 2.643***
(0.089) (0.088) (0.086)
Observations 26,320 26,320 27,291 27,291 27,291
R-squared 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998 0.997
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks, using 3-year averages. PPML estimations. Columns
1 and 2 use automatic three-way clustering by exp-id, imp-id, and time-id. Standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-country-time (µit), destination-country-time
(µjt), and country-par (µij) fixed effects are not reported. FTA and FTA_depth are taken from
the DESTA database.
Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI, DESTA and CEPII databases.
In columns (3) to (5) we give the results of a regression specification with the
"standard" gravity variables, where ln_DIST is the log of the weighted distance
indicator, CNTG is the contiguity dummy (for countries that share a common
border), LANG is the common language dummy and CLNY is the dummy that
identifies a common coloniser post 1945.24 In these specifications both the PTA
depth and PTA dummy variables are also positive and significant, but with a much
higher coefficient values. These last results suggests that not controlling for non-
observable time-invariant factors (as done when we use the country-pair fixed effects
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3), over-estimates the impact of PTAs on FDI flows.
Therefore, we work primarily with the country-pair fixed effect specification, which
provides more accurate estimated coefficients of the impact of PTAs on inward FDI
stocks.
The robustness of results with this baseline regression was tested by two variants
that we show in the Appendix (Tables 9 and 10). In these tables, we use 4-year
averages and the yearly FDI data, instead of the 3-year averages as in Table 3. Most
24As explained above all these standard gravity variables are taken from the CEPII gravity
database. When we use "comleg" variables from the CEPII database (i.e. common legal origins
before and after transition) also result in positive and significant coefficients when used together
with the other bilateral time-invariant variables (results not presented).
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of the coefficients retain similar values and significance levels, which lend robustness
to our main results. In Table 11 in the Appendix we also present the baseline
results using an alternative for our bilateral policy variable (PTA). Instead of the
DESTA indicators, Table 11 uses the PTA indicators from the World Bank database.
All PTA depth indicators are significant when we use the country-pair fixed effect
specification and also when we use the standard gravity approach with additional
explanatory variables. Hence, our baseline can be considered as very robust.
To facilitate the interpretation of the estimated regression parameters for the
policy variables using the PTA depth indicators from DESTA, we translate them
in a percentage effect on the dependent variable (inward FDI), using the following
formula:
V = (expγˆ − 1) ∗ 100 (6)
where V is the FDI effect (in percentages) of each individual indicator, with γˆ being
the estimated coefficient by indicators. In Table 4 we present the result for the
PTA depth indicator when different depth values are used. Recall that the DESTA
database is ranked from one (shallow PTA) to seven (deepest PTA). For instance,
the implementation of the deepest PTA is estimated to increase the bilateral inward
FDI stock of the host country by approximately 54%, while a shallow PTA (with
DESTa index of one) will only increase bilateral FDI by 6%. The average effect of
the PTA, which is estimated using the PTA dummy variable, has an impact of 38%
on bilateral FDI flows between the countries that signed the PTA.
Table 4: FTA impact on FDI by value of FTA depth indicator
variable estimated significance Number of FDI effect
coefficient levels observations (percentage)
DESTA depth index
depth=1 0.062 *** 26,320 6.4
depth=2 0.124 *** 26,320 13.2
depth=3 0.186 *** 26,320 20.4
depth=4 0.248 *** 26,320 28.1
depth=5 0.310 *** 26,320 36.3
depth=6 0.372 *** 26,320 45.1
depth=7 0.434 *** 26,320 54.3
Notes: Values taken from Table 5. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI,
DESTA and CEPII databases.
It should be kept in mind that we are conducting a "partial equilibrium" analysis
here, were only the bilateral stocks change after a change in the bilateral policy vari-
able. The multilateral resistance terms in the gravity model take into account each
country’s relative opportunity cost for FDI investing. However, a partial analysis
cannot capture all knock-on welfare effects of more FDI via domestic consumption
prices and production efficiency. For example, if a PTA (such as the Pacific Alliance)
creates a more integrated market area (via deeper PTAs and FDI inflows) it may
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also attract more FDI from non-member countries. However, to analyse these addi-
tional effects, a "general equilibrium" analysis has to be conducted, which is beyond
of the scope of this study.
4.2 Assessing the FDI impact of different policy variables
In our second-step we further analyse the impact of the policy time-varying indica-
tors. For this purpose we run a set of PPML regressions using the country-pair fixed
effects specification including an alternative set of policy indicators. First, we use the
individual components of the DESTA PTA depth indicator: full_PTA, standards,
services, competition, procurement, investment and intellectual property rights (see
Section 3.3.1). Second, we use the trade policy indicators from the CEPII database
(see Section 3.3.3). The simple variable correlations are presented in the Appendix
(Table 12). It is interesting to observe that the correlation between the DESTA PTA
dummy and depth indicators (PTA and PTA_depth, respectively) and the PTA in-
dicators from the CEPII database are relatively low (around 0.6). The individual
DESTA index components are highly correlated with the depth index (PTA_depth)
but less with the dummy PTA. To analyse the impact of the investments provision
in the DESTA database (D_inv) we also combine this variable with the PTA depth
indicator (D_depth_inv) and the PTA WTO dummy (D_wto_inv).
In Table 5 we show the list of coefficients for each policy variable included individ-
ually when running equation 4 with 3-year inward FDI averages, including domestic
stocks and domestic dummy variables set to one. We use again the formula from
Equation 6 to obtain the expected FDI effects of each policy variable. From Ta-
ble 5 we observe that of the DESTA depth index all provisions have significant and
positive estimated coefficients, and all have very similar impacts, except for the pub-
lic procurement provision (D_proc). It is important to note that the intellectual
property provisions have the largest FDI impact (44.5%), which is higher than the
investment provisions (35.5%). When all seven provisions are included (D_depth7)
the effect increases to 47.6%. When we combine the investment provisions with the
depth index (D_depth_inv) we also find that this has an additional 5% positive
impact on FDI.
The impact of FTA_depth is not linear, i.e. increases in the PTA index do not
seem to have a linear and continuous effect on FDI. From Table 4 we observe that the
expected effect of a PTA with index 6 is 45% while the (D_depth6) is not significant
when we isolate the PTAs with depth index 6 (D_depth6). This can be explained
by the fact that most PTAs with depth 6 usually lack the procurement provision,
which has the lowest impact. Table 5 also analyses the FDI impact of some PTA
indicators. The only one that is significant is "PTA_wto" –the PTA indicator from
the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Information System. Two other alternative
PTA indicators are "PTA_hmr" (the PTA dummy variable taken from Head et al.,
2010) and "PTA_bb" (taken from Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). The former has the
wrong sign (negative) and the latter is not found to be statistically significant. The
possible explanation is that these indicators have only limited data available and/or
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Table 5: FDI impact of different policy variables
variable estimated significance Number of FDI effect
coefficient levels observations (percentage)
FTA_depth 0.062 *** 26,320 n.a. \1
FTA 0.323 *** 26,320 38.1
D_full 0.321 *** 26,320 37.9
D_stds 0.306 *** 26,320 35.8
D_inv 0.304 *** 26,320 35.5
D_serv 0.285 *** 26,320 33.0
D_proc 0.165 * 26,320 17.9
D_comp 0.292 *** 26,320 33.9
D_ip 0.368 *** 26,320 44.5
D_depth_inv 0.050 *** 26,320 5.1
D_wto_inv 0.312 *** 26,319 36.6
D_depth6 0.042 26,320 4.3
D_depth7 0.389 *** 26,320 47.6
fta_wto 0.104 ** 26,319 11.0
fta_bb 0.012 4,671 n.a. \1
fta_hmr -0.165 ** 11,048 -15.2
comcur -0.156 26,320 -14.4
gatt_b -0.380 ** 26,320 -31.6
gatt1 0.347 ** 26,320 41.5
gatt0 0.146 26,320 15.7
Notes: All coefficients are estimated using the main equation 4 with 3-year FDI averages, domestic
flows and domestic dummies set to one (or zero in the case of the WDI entry barriers). \1 These
indicators are not dummy variables and hence, the FDI effect depends on the specific variable value.
Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI, DESTA and CEPII databases.
use different methodologies from the more recent DESTA database. Moreover, hav-
ing a common currency "comcur" does not have a significant impact on FDI flows,
and membership of the GATT/WTO only has a positive and significant effect if only
one of the countries is a member. Surprisingly, if both countries are members, the
effect is negative, which could be explained by substitution effects between expected
increased trade and FDI flows with the presence of mainly horizontal (market access)
FDI.
We now turn to another bilateral policy variable, the impact of having a bilateral
investment treaty (BIT). We find mixed evidence that this variable can explain
bilateral FDI. When we use our main country-pair fixed effects specification, the
BITs coefficient is positive and significant when using the 4-year FDI averages and
the yearly data, but not when using our main 3-year FDI average specification. On
the other hand, the coefficient is significant but negative for all specifications when
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using the standard gravity specification (see Table 6). The values and significance
of the BITs coefficient is very similar when combining the BITs indicator with the
FTA depth and the FTA dummy variables (not shown), but the FTA indicators have
higher coefficients than the BITs indicator. These mixed results are common on the
literature. Some studies, for example Bergstrand and Egger (2013) find a positive
impact of BITs using the standard gravity specification, but did not use country-
pair fixed effects to account for unobservable bilateral country determinants. On
the other hand, Haftel (2010) argues that only BITs in force (i.e. mutually ratified)
have a positive effect on FDI inflows, while those agreements that are not in force
(only signed) do not have an effect.
Table 6: FDI gravity regressions using BITS for different econometric specifications
and inward FDI stocks for 3-year and 4-year averages and yearly data
3-year average 4-year average yearly data
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BITs 0.288 -1.523*** 0.332*** -1.534*** 0.271* -1.489***
(0.184) (0.067) (0.124) (0.077) (0.155) (0.040)
ln_DIST -0.848*** -0.837*** -0.838***
(0.076) (0.086) (0.045)
CNTG 0.798*** 0.837*** 0.801***
(0.149) (0.172) (0.089)
LANG 1.187*** 1.153*** 1.188***
(0.083) (0.095) (0.049)
CLNY 2.590*** 2.605*** 2.604***
(0.094) (0.108) (0.055)
Observations 26,320 27,291 19,526 20,349 75,248 77,512
R-squared 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.997
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks. PPML estimations using automatic three-way clus-
tering by exp-id, imp-id, and time-id for the country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors in paren-
theses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-country-time (µit) and destination-country-time
(µjt) fixed effects are not reported. BITs data are taken from UNCTAD. Source: Own estimations
using UNCTAD bilateral FDI, DESTA and CEPII databases.
Another possible explanation for these results is that BITs are by construction
different from FTA agreements and they also signal country specific FDI investment
risks. BITs are set to guarantee private investments from one country into another
country by means of different instruments, such as protection from expropriation,
free transfer of means, fair and equitable treatment, foreign investors fair and equi-
table, non-discriminatory, most-favoured-nation and national treatment, and some-
times the use of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms (cf. UNCTAD,
2007). In this regard, a core objective of BITs is to reduce the investment risks of
FDI by establishing transparency about what those risks are in a particular country
(Bergstrand and Egger, 2013). Thus, BITs are more likely to be established when
countries want to protect firms that want to investment in other countries deemed
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to be considered risky; and not much to protect North-North investment, for which
the national legal system is usually provides enough protection to foreigners. For
example, the US had BIT agreements with many Eastern European countries before
their EU accession, but do not have BITs with their main trading partners (e.g. old
EU members, Canada, China, Japan and Mexico.) Under these circumstances, the
BITs indicator may be signalling country-specific investment risks that are picked up
by the country-pair fixed effects (where the coefficients are positive and significant),
but not in the standard gravity specification, where the coefficient becomes negative
and the impact of signing a BIT agreement does include the investment risks.
4.3 Inward FDI multilateral resistances
In our final step, we obtain the inward multilateral trade resistances (MRs) co-
efficients that are associated with the PA countries as FDI destination countries.
The inward MR terms are taken from the trade sub-model of the structural gravity
system. They capture each destination country’s relative inward trade obstacles,
because the latter reduce the bilateral FDI flows. Appendix B describes the coher-
ence of the structural FDI and trade sub-models of the Anderson et al. (2016, 2017)
structural gravity system. The annual inward MRs provide a direct answer to our
first research question, by analysing how FDI investment flows to specific-countries,
once controlling for country-specific variables that change over time (i.e. bilateral
trade costs, GDP and income per capita) and FTAs. Moreover, the inward MR
also include the effects of trade obstacles that are invariant over time, like distance,
contiguity, shared language and history. Therefore, a higher inward MR in the PA
countries (here interpreted as destination countries j for FDI) implies that they will
have less imports, higher prices, lower real income, and hence lower Ej and lower
Yj . This is a already a sufficient condition for them to have less FDI absorption
capacity, even if we disregard their explicit FDI barriers ωij,t.
In Table 7 we show the inward MRs for the PA countries and some selected
countries to compare with. We also estimate the effects of these coefficients on the
expected effects on FDI using the formula from Equation 6.
We can obtain several conclusions from this table. First, in general the inward
MRs have been decreasing in the (unweighted) full sample (global) average, from
an FDI impact of around 14% at the beginning of the 2000s to around 10% in
2010-2012. This decreasing trend has been, in general, more pronounced for most
Latin American countries, with the exception of Peru, Panama and Uruguay. In
particular, some countries have experienced very substantial decreases in the inward
MRs (i.e. Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Paraguay). These countries
were above the global inward MR averages in 2000-2003, but below this average in
2010-2012. On the other hand, in rich OECD countries (e.g. USA) and China, the
inward MRs have been increasing over time.25
Second, the Pacific Alliance countries have relatively high inward MRs that are
above the global average during the full sample period, even though they MR terms
25The data with the full sample of countries is available upon request.
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Table 7: Pacific Alliance and selected countries, inward multilateral resistance (MR)
terms
Inward MRs FDI effects (%) FDI effects (%)
Host country 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 in 2001-2003 in 2010-2012
Chile 0.139 0.134 0.119 0.106 14.9 11.2
Colombia 0.128 0.126 0.094 0.102 13.6 10.7
Mexico 0.174 0.179 0.149 0.112 19.0 11.8
Peru 0.120 0.141 0.136 0.125 12.8 13.3
Argentina 0.163 0.174 0.161 0.133 17.7 14.2
Bolivia 0.164 0.118 0.091 0.064 17.8 6.6
Brazil 0.192 0.204 0.167 0.086 21.1 8.9
Costa Rica 0.136 0.172 0.111 0.061 14.6 6.3
Ecuador 0.103 0.127 0.094 0.064 10.9 6.6
Panama 0.110 0.172 0.128 0.119 11.6 12.6
Paraguay 0.166 0.179 0.095 0.063 18.1 6.5
Uruguay 0.072 0.109 0.124 0.127 7.5 13.5
Venezuela 0.140 0.154 0.106 0.090 15.1 9.4
China 0.092 0.128 0.155 0.165 9.6 18.0
USA 0.143 0.178 0.179 0.162 15.4 17.6
Sample mean 0.129 0.119 0.105 0.094 13.8 9.9
Notes: Taken from the country-pair fixed effect specification using 3-year FDI averages (results in
column 1 in Table 3). Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI, DESTA and
CEPII databases.
were decreasing over the period. The exception is Peru where the inward MRs have
increased over time and are in the period 2010-2012 the highest among PA countries
(13.3% effect on FDI). The other three PA countries have inward MRs that reduce
FDI inflows by around 11%, which is still above the global average.
The inward MRs values are very similar when using the PTA dummy instead
of the PTA depth indicator (as in Table 7), however, the inward MRs values sig-
nificantly increase when using the standard gravity specification (columns 3 to 5 in
Table 3, which reflects the importance of the unobserved FDI costs that are captured
by the country-pair fixed effects.26
For explaining the MRs and their relation with the PA countries, we employ the
following indicators, which can be considered to be FDI determinants:
• The World Development Indicators (WDI) on the cost of doing business. We
use here only the indicators for the destination countries.
• The OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. It is available for all
OECD countries and some additional selected countries (included Colombia
26Results not shown but are available upon request.
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and Peru). It has data for 1997, 2003 and 2006, and uninterrupted annual
data from 2010-2015.27
• The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). We use five of the six indicators
(we only exclude "voice and accountability") and we take the yearly estimate
for each indicator.
• Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. Here we take
the summary index for each relevant year.
• The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database on the fol-
lowing variables:
1. Human capital levels proxied by the labour force with basic (lab_bas)
and advanced (lab_adv) education
2. The overall logistics performance index
3. Taxes on income, profits and capital gains as a percentage of revenue.
We then run simple OLS regressions using the estimated inward multilateral
resistance terms from our main gravity specification (i.e. column 1 in Table 3).
However, most of these variables are highly correlated with each other –in particular
the WGI and the EFW variables. So we cannot combine them in a single regression.
A summary of these regressions is presented in Table 8. We find that the FDI
regulatory restrictiveness index (FDI_restr) has a positive and significant impact
on the inward MR terms, as expected. More FDI regulatory restrictions will reduce
the inward resistance to FDI inflows. We find the same result for the four WDI
entry costs (number of procedures and/or days to start a business). However, the
governance variables and the EPW index all have a positive and significant impact on
the inward MRs, which means that more political stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption and larger economic freedom is
related to higher resistance to inward FDI stocks. This result is counterintuitive, and
is probably related to the latest trend of increased inward MR terms in rich OECD
countries, which usually have the highest values for the WGI and EPW indices.28
When we use the additional potential FDI determinants from the WDI database,
we also find that some of these indicators have a counterintuitive coefficient value:
the more workers with a basic and advanced education (as a percentage of the total
workforce) and the better the logistics performance of the country, the higher the
inward MR terms. A potential problem with these indicators is that the coverage is
less complete (i.e. much fewer number of observations than the other indicators) and
skewed toward OECD countries that have better statistics. Hence, these indicators
27To fit these data with our 3-year average data, we take the index for 2010 as our value for 2009.
The FDI restrictiveness indicator is available by industry group (agriculture, manufacturing and
services) but we only use the total economy indicators.
28We find the same results when we standardised these indexes –i.e. when they have been rescaled
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
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can also be biased by the latest trend of increased inward FDI resistance in OECD
countries. On the other hand, the coefficient on the taxes on income and profits
has a positive and significant coefficient, which is as expected: higher taxes that can
be levied over business operations from multinationals are associated with higher
inward MR terms.29
Table 8: OLS regression results for individual determinants of inward multilateral
resistance terms
variable estimated significance Number of R-squared
coefficient levels observations
FDI_restr 0.683 *** 14,104 0.459
entry_cost_d 0.001 *** 21,351 0.075
entry_proc_d 0.014 *** 21,351 0.702
entry_time_d 0.002 *** 21,351 0.325
entry_tp_d 0.002 *** 21,351 0.401
Political stability 0.033 *** 27,056 0.037
Government effectiveness 0.063 *** 27,050 0.194
Regulatory quality 0.071 *** 27,050 0.225
Rule of law 0.051 *** 27,057 0.121
Control corruption 0.043 *** 27,050 0.099
EFW index 0.020 *** 21,708 0.884
Advanced education 0.002 *** 13,278 0.930
Basic education 0.003 *** 13,269 0.799
Overall logistics index 0.038 *** 6,712 0.918
Taxes on income & profits 0.004 *** 21,586 0.716
Notes: The dependent variable is the estimated inward MRs from Table 3 using 3-year FDI averages.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own estimations
using UNCTAD bilateral FDI, DESTA, the WDI data on the cost of doing business, the OECD’s
FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (F DI_restr), the Worldwide Governance Indicators and the
Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index.
When we run the same regressions but using only a Latin America sub-sample,
we find that the WGI governance quality indicator have all a negative coefficient (see
Table 13 in the Appendix). Thus, better governance in these countries is associated
with lower inward MRs. However, the economic freedom index, the human capital
and logistics index are still positive and significant. In the case of the human capital
and logistics indicators the coverage is very limited for Latin American countries.
29However, it is important to recall that many multinationals operate on special export processing
zones and/or other special regimes that exonerate foreign companies from paying corporate taxes
or provide deductions with respect to the rates paid by national companies.
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Nevertheless, these remaining counterintuitive results for the Latin America sub-
sample warrant some further research, which is beyond the scope of this study.
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5 Sensitivity estimations
To analyse the robustness of our results to different specification, we run a series
of additional sensitivity tests, which are explained below. Note however, that we
already ran our main econometric specification using different yearly averages for
inward FDI (3- and 4-year averages) and also using the yearly data, and in addition,
we employed different specifications in the PPML regressions: using the automatic
three-way clustering option, robust standard errors, clustered standard errors by
country pairs and assuming symmetry in the pair fixed effects.
5.1 Excluding domestic stocks
We estimate our main specifications excluding the "domestic inward" stocks taken as
the country’s capital stock data. In Table 14 in the Appendix we present the results.
As expected, we find that the coefficients from the standard gravity equations are
significantly different from those obtained when we control for the domestic invest-
ment stocks. For instance, the impact of the PTA depth indicator is still significant
but substantially smaller –by a factor of 10– than before and the PTA dummy in-
dicator is not non-significant and even negative. Moreover, the coefficients for the
standard gravity variables (distance, contiguity, language and colony) are smaller
as well. This highlights the importance of controlling for domestic capital stocks in
the gravity estimations as explained in the best-practices taken from Yotov et al.
(2016). In particular, using domestic capital stocks we can control for the effects
of non-discriminatory trade policy, consistent identify the effects of PTAs and other
bilateral trade policies and to obtain a bias-free estimation of the effects of PTAs on
FDI inward stocks.
5.2 Using FDI flow data instead of stock data
The UNCTAD Bilateral FDI database also provides data on FDI inflows and out-
flows. In addition, we employ the World Bank’s WDI data on gross fixed capital
formation (GFKF) to account for the domestic investment flows. We then use these
FDI inflow data in our main econometric specification using 3-year average FDI
inflows and country-pair fixed effects. The results are shown in Table 15 in the
Appendix. We find that the coefficients for the PTA depth and dummy indicators
are still significant and positive, but with lower coefficient values and statistical
significance. But in general the results are very similar and convey the same mes-
sage that implementing an PTA increases bilateral FDI inflows. Moreover, when we
exclude the domestic investment flows, we find again that the econometric results
are substantially changed –i.e. now the PTA depth indicator is negative and not
significant– which reinforces the importance of including domestic flows or stocks in
the econometric specification.
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5.3 Alternative PTA dummy variables
We use alternative PTA dummy information from Mario Larch’s Regional Trade
Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008). His database distinguishes
between different degrees of trade integration: partial scope agreements (PS), tra-
ditional PTAs, customs unions (CU) and economic integration agreements (EIA).
In Table 16 in the Appendix we summarise our results using these indicators when
we use our main econometric specification (i.e. 3-year average FDI inward stocks
using country-pair fixed effects). There we find confirmation of our main results
that using a dummy for the presence of some kind of trade agreement ("RTA" in
Table 16) has a positive and significant effect on FDI inflows, with a coefficient
value of 0.313 that is very similar to our PTA-dummy coefficient value (0.323). In
addition, using these indicators we also find that deeper integration ("CU & EIA")
has the largest effect on FDI (129%), which is a combination of the large impacts
of being inside a customs union (119%) and economic integration agreement (48%).
However, we also find that traditional shallow trade agreements (PTA) do not have
a statistically significant impact.30 This also reinforces our findings that the depth
of the trade agreements is crucial to explain the FDI impact, and provides more
accurate information than just using dummy variables for the presence of an PTA.
5.4 Using lead and lagged variables
We can also run sensitivity analysis using lagged and lead values for our PTA indi-
cators for the yearly data. The intuition is that the specific impact of an PTA can
happen some years before or after the agreement enters into force. Thus, we run
our main specification using country-pair fixed effects with the yearly data using
one to three lags and one to three leads (forward in time). We find that signing a
PTA has an effect on FDI flows already three years before and up-to three years
after. In particular, all our lagged and lead variables yield a positive and significant
coefficient for the PTA depth variable (see Table 16 in the Appendix). We obtain
the same results when we use the PTA dummy variable. The effects are of a similar
magnitude but slightly higher one year before (L1) and one year after (F1) the PTA
has been implemented. This suggests both an anticipatory effect on multinationals
to establish its presence in the country beforehand, but also after the trade agree-
ment has been signed. In the case of the Pacific Alliance, which entered into force
in 2016, then we expect that already in 2013 the FDI inflows where being positively
affected by the agreement and will continue to have a positive impact at least until
2019.
30This could signal that shallow agreements, which only partially tackle tariff reductions and
seldom have trade facilitation and behind-the-border measures that reduce NTBs are not enough
to encourage multinationals to invest in the country.
29
	 	
	
6 Summary and policy implications
We now summarise our main results and their policy relevance and potential implica-
tions. First, we found that implementing a PTA has a positive effect on FDI inflows
and inward stocks, even when the main purpose of such agreements is to increase bi-
lateral trade between the signing partners. More recent deep trade agreements –that
include investments, public procurement and intellectual property rights provisions–
are also expected to have a larger positive impact on both trade and FDI flows. In
this respect, we find that the deeper the PTA the larger the expected bilateral FDI
effects. This answers our second research question
This means that the signing of a PTA such as the Pacific Alliance trade agreement
(with a DESTA index of six) is expected to have a positive effect on the bilateral
FDI between the four partners. Using our empirical methodology, we estimate that
bilateral FDI flows between Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru will increase by
approximately 45% or almost double in the following years. This will be particularly
important for Peru and especially Colombia, which have a large share of FDI coming
from other PA countries. In the period 2010-2012, 63% of all inward FDI stocks in
Colombia came from within the PA, while the same figure is of 39% for Peru. The PA
initiative was launched back in 2011, established in 2012, but not until 2013 where
tariff reductions negotiated, and they only came into effect in 2016 (which is also the
year that the agreement was officially notified as a PTA in the WTO). However, we
find that PTA agreements have an effect up to three years before the official entry
into force of the agreement and also up to three years after the implementation.
In addition, we find that the potential impact of the PA agreement is substan-
tial, with almost a doubling of the intra-PA FDI inward stocks with respect to the
values reported in 2012, the latest period with available data. In this respect, our
gravity estimation methodology allows use to estimate expected FDI shock by look-
ing to the past experience for similar PTA treaties in the past. For this we rely
on the DESTA database (updated in the spring of 2017) to distinguish preferential
trade agreements by design, active mechanisms, and depth. Our results, moreover,
are robust to different specifications. For instance, using FDI inflows instead of
FDI inward stock and employing different PTA databases that have been originally
compiled by CEPII, Egger and Larch (2008), and more recently the World Bank
(Hofmann et al., 2017).
Using the inward multilateral resistance terms from our gravity estimations we do
find that direct investment flows between Pacific Alliance members fall short of what
could be expected on the basis of comparable economic factors in other countries.
Once we account for the bilateral distance to trading partners, the presence of a
border, of a common language or of a common coloniser, plus the existence of current
PTAs, we find that the four PA members have higher inward resistance to FDI flows
than the global sample and even, with respect to many Latin American countries,
where the trend has been of a sharp decrease on inward FDI resistance. Nevertheless,
we find only relatively small decreases in the PA members, and in Peru these inward
resistances have even increased. On the other hand, the trend in richer OECD
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countries and China has been of a rise on the inward FDI resistances, which can
signal a shift on the speed of globalisation that could also be related to the global
trade slowdown (cf. Hoekman, 2015)
Analysing possible FDI determinants that can be related to these inward FDI
resistance terms, we find that restrictive FDI regulations (using the Regulatory Re-
strictiveness Index from the OECD), the cost –in terms of number of procedures
and number of days– of starting new businesses (using the World Banks’ WDI in-
dicators) and the national level of taxes on income, profit and capital gains (taken
also from the WDI database) are strongly correlated to the inward resistance terms.
Moreover, when analysing the Latin America as a region, we also find the general in-
dicators of governance –i.e. political stability and absence of violence and terrorism,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption
are indeed strongly related to the inward FDI resistances. On the other hand, higher
economic liberalisation (taken from the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the
World index) can increase these inward FDI resistance terms, but more research is
needed to fully comprehend these mechanisms, and those of human capital levels
and infrastructure and logistics performances.
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A Additional tables
Table 9: Main FDI gravity regressions using 4-year average inward FDI stocks
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FTA_depth 0.034** 0.284***
(0.017) (0.019)
FTA 0.266*** 0.742***
(0.094) (0.112)
ln_DIST -0.859*** -0.432*** -0.764***
(0.086) (0.071) (0.084)
CNTG 0.912*** 0.599*** 0.699***
(0.171) (0.154) (0.145)
LANG 1.462*** 1.408*** 1.451***
(0.092) (0.096) (0.091)
CLNY 2.640*** 2.627*** 2.651***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.099)
Observations 19,526 19,526 20,349 20,349 20,349
R-squared 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998 0.997
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks, using 4-year averages. PPML estimations. Columns
1-2 use automatic three-way clustering by exp-id, imp-id, and time-id, other columns use robust
standard errors. All SE reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-country-
time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt) and country-pair (µij) fixed effects are not reported. FTA
and FTA_depth are taken from the DESTA database. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD
bilateral FDI, DESTA and CEPII databases.
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Table 10: FDI gravity regressions using yearly FDI inward stock data
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FTA_depth 0.058** 0.288***
(0.026) (0.010)
FTA 0.300*** 0.725***
(0.084) (0.058)
ln_DIST -0.853*** -0.417*** -0.756***
(0.045) (0.037) (0.044)
CNTG 0.895*** 0.578*** 0.691***
(0.088) (0.079) (0.075)
LANG 1.463*** 1.391*** 1.450***
(0.047) (0.050) (0.047)
CLNY 2.645*** 2.630*** 2.656***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.051)
Observations 75,248 75,248 77,512 77,512 77,512
R-squared 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998 0.997
Notes: Dependent variable: yearly FDI inward stocks. PPML estimations. Columns 1-2 use
automatic three-way clustering by exp-id, imp-id, and time-id, other columns use robust standard
errors. All SE reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-country-time
(µit), destination-country-time (µjt) and country-pair (µij) fixed effects are not reported. FTA
and FTA_depth are taken from the DESTA database. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD
bilateral FDI, DESTA and CEPII databases.
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Table 11: Main FDI gravity regressions using 3-year average inward FDI stocks and
FTA indicators the World Bank database
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FTA_wb 0.398*** 0.880***
(0.083) (0.098)
wb_tot_le 0.030*** 0.066***
(0.008) (0.003)
wb_tot_pr 0.026*** 0.054***
(0.007) (0.002)
wb_core 0.033*** 0.095***
(0.008) (0.007)
wb_pca 0.163*** 0.388***
(0.040) (0.021)
ln_DIST -0.755*** -0.167*** -0.302*** -0.538*** -0.373***
(0.073) (0.061) (0.062) (0.067) (0.062)
CNTG 0.624*** 0.524*** 0.671*** 0.569*** 0.593***
(0.125) (0.137) (0.137) (0.133) (0.133)
LANG 1.464*** 1.437*** 1.366*** 1.409*** 1.460***
(0.079) (0.083) (0.083) (0.081) (0.079)
CLNY 2.610*** 1.800*** 1.981*** 2.607*** 2.341***
(0.086) (0.075) (0.074) (0.085) (0.074)
Observations 26,320 26,320 26,320 26,320 26,320 27,291 27,291 27,291 27,291 27,291
R-squared 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks, using 3-year averages. PPML estimations. Columns
1 to 5 use automatic three-way clustering by exp-id, imp-id, and time-id. Robust standard errors
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Host-country-time (µit) and origin-country-time
(µjt) fixed effects are not reported. The F T Awb dummy and the FTA depth indicators (wbtotle,
wbtotpr, wbcore, and wbpca) are estimated using the World Bank database (Hofman et al. 2017).
Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI, World Bank FTA depth and CEPII
databases.
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Table 12: Correlations of policy variables
l i_ave3 FTA FTA_de h D_full D_stds D_inv D_serv D_proc D_comp D_ip D_dept v D_wto_ v D_main D_depth6 D_depth7 fta_wto fta_bb fta_hmr gatt_o gatt_d gatt_b gatt1 gatt0 comcur bits
ln_fdi_ave3 1
FTA 0.2563 1
FTA_depth 0.3929 0.8089 1
D_full 0.3068 0.8654 0.8717 1
D_stds 0.2565 0.9457 0.8095 0.7998 1
D_inv 0.3779 0.601 0.8938 0.6846 0.5831 1
D_serv 0.3699 0.6873 0.9356 0.7784 0.6731 0.8446 1
D_proc 0.3795 0.5974 0.896 0.6747 0.6318 0.7842 0.8425 1
D_comp 0.3546 0.6461 0.9093 0.7344 0.6317 0.8569 0.892 0.7988 1
D_ip 0.4069 0.5603 0.8637 0.6459 0.591 0.8202 0.7642 0.8521 0.7275 1
D_depth_inv 0.4008 0.5918 0.9104 0.6773 0.5936 0.9846 0.8457 0.8395 0.8651 0.8788 1
D_wto_inv 0.1813 0.4459 0.6571 0.5117 0.4289 0.7419 0.6274 0.5569 0.6419 0.5852 0.7244 1
D_main 0.4007 0.526 0.8573 0.6078 0.5562 0.8752 0.7637 0.8506 0.7768 0.9389 0.9372 0.6278 1
D_depth6 0.0302 0.1357 0.1818 0.1568 0.1435 0.2072 0.1974 0.1836 0.133 0.0998 0.1853 0.1212 0.0891 1
D_depth7 0.407 0.5105 0.8423 0.5899 0.5398 0.8493 0.7427 0.8544 0.79 0.9111 0.9199 0.6091 0.9704 -0.0446 1
fta_wto 0.1241 0.6297 0.5691 0.6931 0.5738 0.3903 0.5147 0.4269 0.4732 0.3775 0.3799 0.6186 0.3259 0.0654 0.3162 1
fta_bb 0.1827 0.5313 0.5684 0.5953 0.4946 0.477 0.519 0.4302 0.5183 0.4492 0.4741 0.6826 0.4203 -0.0073 0.4252 0.7648 1
fta_hmr 0.1194 0.6062 0.5668 0.664 0.5821 0.3914 0.5161 0.4301 0.4788 0.3758 0.379 0.612 0.3206 0.0655 0.3114 0.9535 0.7739 1
gatt_o 0.0414 0.0987 0.092 0.068 0.1078 0.0739 0.0925 0.0725 0.0891 0.0577 0.0649 0.1176 0.0433 0.0389 0.0366 0.0952 0.1179 0.1087 1
gatt_d 0.0542 0.1676 0.1682 0.1494 0.1719 0.1381 0.1643 0.1385 0.1512 0.1152 0.1322 0.1507 0.1081 0.0265 0.1074 0.1343 0.1453 0.1515 0.0014 1
gatt_b 0.0672 0.2138 0.1984 0.182 0.2176 0.1574 0.1894 0.1568 0.1775 0.128 0.1466 0.1972 0.1131 0.0461 0.1082 0.19 0.2067 0.2132 0.6191 0.74 1
gatt1 -0.0603 -0.2209 -0.1938 -0.1943 -0.2182 -0.149 -0.1783 -0.1486 -0.1679 -0.1207 -0.1388 -0.1873 -0.1069 -0.0428 -0.1026 -0.2033 -0.211 -0.2259 -0.5177 -0.6607 -0.9528 1
gatt0 -0.0276 0.0055 -0.0307 0.0248 -0.0158 -0.0395 -0.0507 -0.039 -0.0454 -0.0339 -0.0369 -0.048 -0.0291 -0.0146 -0.0268 0.0271 -0.0029 0.0237 -0.3752 -0.3139 -0.2323 -0.0739 1
comcur 0.1791 0.2013 0.2991 0.235 0.2138 0.2786 0.2674 0.2804 0.286 0.3013 0.3034 0.3529 0.3229 -0.0195 0.3337 0.2537 0.5691 0.2594 0.0355 0.064 0.0721 -0.0664 -0.024 1
bits -0.0765 0.0196 -0.043 0.0215 0.0017 -0.0776 -0.0491 -0.0646 -0.0417 -0.0771 -0.0828 0.0037 -0.0931 0.0232 -0.0865 0.0913 -0.0222 0.087 0.0662 -0.0607 0.0043 -0.0111 0.0214 -0.1166 1
Source: UNCTAD bilateral FDI, DESTA and CEPII databases.
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Table 13: Latin America sub-sample, OLS regression results for individual determi-
nants of inward multilateral resistance terms
variable estimated significance Number of R-squared
coefficient levels observations
FDI_restr 0.958 *** 1,315 0.646
entry_cost_d 0.002 *** 2,327 0.333
entry_proc_d 0.010 *** 2,327 0.837
entry_time_d 0.001 *** 2,327 0.575
entry_tp_d 0.001 *** 2,327 0.627
Political stability -0.076 *** 2,779 0.166
Government effectiviness -0.030 *** 2,779 0.017
Regulatory quality -0.001 2,779 0.000
Rule of law -0.080 *** 2,779 0.237
Control corruption -0.049 *** 2,779 0.070
EFW index 0.018 *** 2,779 0.880
Notes: Includes only Latin American countries, excluding all Caribbean countries but the Dominican
Republic. The dependent variable is the estimated inward MRs from Table 3 using 3-year FDI
averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own
estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI, DESTA, the WDI data on the cost of doing business, the
OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (F DI_restr), the Worldwide Governance Indicators
and the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index.
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Table 14: Main FDI gravity regressions using 3-year average inward FDI stocks,
excluding domestic investment stocks
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FTA_depth 0.006** 0.041***
(0.003) (0.013)
FTA -0.025 0.653***
(0.041) (0.083)
ln_DIST -0.548*** -0.483*** -0.386***
(0.037) (0.047) (0.043)
CNTG 0.573*** 0.536*** 0.469***
(0.092) (0.091) (0.081)
LANG 0.498*** 0.522*** 0.527***
(0.082) (0.083) (0.086)
CLNY 1.821*** 1.792*** 1.853***
(0.249) (0.233) (0.212)
Observations 25,567 25,567 26,488 26,488 26,488
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.675 0.677 0.700
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks, using 3-year averages. PPML estimations. Columns
1-2 use automatic three-way clustering by exp-id, imp-id, and time-id, other columns use robust
standard errors. All SE reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-country-
time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt) and country-pair (µij) fixed effects are not reported. FTA
and FTA_depth are taken from the DESTA database. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD
bilateral FDI, DESTA and CEPII databases.
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Table 15: FDI gravity regressions using 3-year average FDI inflows
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FTA_depth 0.039* 0.203***
(0.022) (0.057)
FTA 0.187** 0.687**
(0.088) (0.282)
ln_DIST -0.533*** -0.250 -0.427**
(0.164) (0.162) (0.166)
CNTG 1.028** 0.826** 0.880**
(0.416) (0.369) (0.358)
LANG 0.898*** 0.846*** 0.867***
(0.233) (0.226) (0.223)
CLNY 3.106*** 3.124*** 3.147***
(0.257) (0.236) (0.232)
Observations 20,069 20,069 26,436 26,436 26,436
R-squared 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998 0.998
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inflows, using 3-year averages. PPML estimations. Columns
1-2 use automatic three-way clustering by exp-id, imp-id, and time-id, other columns use robust
standard errors. All SE reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-country-
time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt) and country-pair (µij) fixed effects are not reported. FTA
and FTA_depth are taken from the DESTA database. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD
bilateral FDI, DESTA CEPII and WDI databases.
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Table 16: FDI impact of alternative policy variables and different lags and leads in
yearly data
estimated significance Number of FDI effect
coefficient levels observations (percentage)
Larch’s indicators
Customs Union (CU) 0.786 *** 26,320 119.5
Free trade agreement (FTA) 0.115 26,320 12.2
Economic Integration Agreement (EIA) 0.394 *** 26,320 48.3
Partial scope agreement (PS) 0.374 *** 26,320 45.4
CU & EIA 0.829 *** 26,320 129.1
FTA & EIA 0.158 26,320 17.1
RTA \2 0.313 *** 26,320 36.8
Lagged (L) and forward (F) FTA_depth
FTA_depth_L1 0.055 ** 69,187 5.6
FTA_depth_L2 0.049 ** 63,123 5.1
FTA_depth_L3 0.046 *** 56,986 4.7
FTA_depth_F1 0.053 *** 67,092 5.4
FTA_depth_F2 0.051 *** 58,601 5.3
FTA_depth_F3 0.039 *** 49,232 4.0
Notes: Yearly lags on the FTA_depth indicator are denoted by (L1, L2 and L3) for one, two and
three-years respectively. Accordingly, yearly leads (forward) are denoted by F1, F2 and F3. \2
RTA=1 if any one of CU, FTA, EIA or PS is in place, and 0 otherwise. All policy coefficients are
estimated using the main equation 4 with 3-year FDI averages, domestic flows and domestic
dummies set to one (or zero in the case of the WDI entry barriers). All the lags and leads
coefficients are estimated in the same manner but using yearly data. Source: Own estimations
using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and BIts databases and Larch’s Regional Trade Agreements
Database.
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B The relation between the structural gravity sub-models
for trade and FDI
The gravity model for FDI is analogous to the gravity trade model, but not the same.
The gravity trade model is developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who
were the first to introduce the so-called multilateral resistance (MR) terms. The MR
terms express in fact that world trade is a closed system, and that trade costs in one
country have an impact in all other countries, whatever small this impact may be.
The same holds for shocks in the economic size of a particular country: it changes
the relative trade (dis)advantages in all countries. The MR terms are sophisticated
interaction terms that can be interpreted as the relative inward (outward) trade
costs, relative to all other countries, and given the size distribution of countries.
The structural gravity system for bilateral trade can be summarised in the next
three equations:31
Xij =
YiEj
Y
A
tij
ΠiPj
B1−σ
(7)
P 1−σj =
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41−σ Yi
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tij
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(9)
where Xij stands for bilateral trade from origin country i and going to destination
country j. The economic size variables (E, Y ) for the partner countries and the
bilateral trade cost variable tij are identical with the FDI model presented in Section
2.1, and reproduced below for the reader’s reference.
FDIstockij = ω
η
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; ∀i, j (10)
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D 1
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; ∀j (12)
An important difference is that the FDI sub-model has no outward multilateral
resistance in the bilateral FDI equation (10), whereas equation (7) holds the trade-
cost term
tij
ΠiPj
in which both MR terms are represented.32 It should be noted that
31Time indexes are suppressed, for brevity.
32Anderson et al. (2017), p.15: "The reason is the non-rival nature of technology capital, in
contrast to goods sales: goods sold to j from i cannot be used elsewhere whereas i’s technology
used in j has no effect on its utilisation elsewhere. Our model assumes that the origin sells the use
of its technology to the destination at its value to the buyer at zero cost to itself".
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